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WHETHER EVENTS AFTER THE FILING 
OF AN INITIAL COMPLAINT MAY CURE 
AN ARTICLE III STANDING DEFECT: THE 
D.C. CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
Abstract: On December 7, 2018, in Scahill v. District of Columbia, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a plaintiff may cure an Ar-
ticle III standing defect through an amended pleading alleging facts that arose after 
the filing of the original complaint. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit joined an expand-
ing plurality of the federal appellate courts in rejecting the alternative approach that 
requires a plaintiff lacking standing at the outset of a lawsuit to file a new lawsuit 
when events subsequent to filing the original complaint have corrected any stand-
ing deficiency. This Comment assesses the D.C. Circuit’s decision and argues that 
the inefficient and needlessly formalistic approach of a shrinking minority of the 
circuits, which Scahill discards, ought to be abandoned entirely. 
INTRODUCTION 
Standing is a legal doctrine that generally concerns the capacity of a party 
to bring suit in court.1 If a plaintiff lacks standing, then, under Article III of the 
Constitution, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.2 Indeed, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has declared standing to be “perhaps the most important” of 
the justiciability doctrines3 and “an essential and unchanging part of the case-
or-controversy requirement of Article III.”4 In spite of the doctrine’s primacy, 
a relatively elementary question concerning standing has gone unanswered by 
the nation’s highest court: when a plaintiff lacks standing at the time an initial 
complaint is filed, can subsequent events, if alleged in supplemental pleadings, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing standing). See 
generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–62 (1992) (explaining the necessity of stand-
ing for federal jurisdiction and detailing its elements). 
 2 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499 (2009) (citing Bender v. Williamsport 
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)) (holding that courts have a duty to ensure that a plaintiff 
has standing under Article III, even when the issue is uncontested by the parties); see also STEPHEN N. 
SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN, THOMAS O. MAIN & ALEXANDRA LAHAV, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 832 (5th ed. 2016) (defining “subject matter ju-
risdiction” as the power of courts to hear and adjudicate disputes). 
 3 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The justiciability doctrines are court-made limits on 
the exercise of the federal judicial power that determine whether a court may hear a given matter. 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 47 (5th ed. 2015). Besides 
standing, the justiciability doctrines include ripeness, mootness, the political question doctrine, and 
the prohibition against advisory opinions. Id.  
 4 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see infra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (explaining Article III’s 
case-or-controversy requirement). 
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cure the defect?5 Considerable disagreement exists among the circuits regard-
ing this narrow, albeit consequential, aspect of the standing doctrine.6 
This Comment examines the circuit split concerning whether events sub-
sequent to the filing of an initial complaint may cure an Article III standing 
deficiency and presents an argument against the alternative, formalistic ap-
proach that some circuits have embraced.7 Part I provides an overview of the 
two competing approaches to the issue adopted by the circuit courts and intro-
duces Scahill v. District of Columbia, a recent decision by the D.C. Circuit that 
emphatically embraced one of these approaches.8 Part II considers Scahill in 
greater depth, analyzing the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the formalistic ap-
proach that would force a plaintiff who lacks standing at the commencement of 
litigation to file a new lawsuit even when the standing deficiency becomes cured 
during the course of the litigation.9 Part III argues that the method adopted in 
Scahill, despite minor deficiencies, should be the standard approach for federal 
courts when confronted with a plaintiff who fails to allege facts in support of 
standing within the initial complaint.10 
I. SCAHILL AND ITS LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Although the Supreme Court has emphasized that plaintiffs must have 
standing for federal courts to hear their claims, it has not given clear guidance 
to the circuits regarding the proper juncture during litigation at which standing 
must be assessed.11 When confronted with the plaintiff who, although lacking 
standing at the outset of litigation, later alleges new facts in support of stand-
ing, the federal appeals courts have taken one of two approaches: (1) dismiss 
the lawsuit for lack of standing, thereby requiring the plaintiff to file a new 
action, or (2) allow the plaintiff to file a supplemental complaint, thereby cur-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting that the Su-
preme Court has not yet addressed whether the lack of Article III standing at the outset of litigation 
is—even when later events cure such standing deficiency—determinative of a court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction); see also Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of Sovereign 
Interests in Future Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1065, 1072–74 (2011) (discussing uncertainty 
regarding the contours and rationale of the standing doctrine, despite its declared importance). An 
“initial complaint” refers to the first pleading a plaintiff files to initiate a lawsuit, that is, prior to any 
amendments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
 6 Compare, e.g., Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Standing is 
determined as of the time the action is brought.”), with Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 973 
F.2d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1992) (“If the complaint as amended alleges sufficient facts to support the requi-
site injury . . . plaintiff will have established standing to sue . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 7 See infra notes 12–88 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 12–42 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 43–65 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 66–88 and accompanying text. 
 11 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
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ing the initial standing defect.12 Section A of this Part provides an overview of 
these two approaches and discusses the reasoning that the federal courts have 
used to justify each.13 Section B presents the factual and procedural back-
ground of Scahill, a recent D.C. Circuit decision that held that, instead of filing 
a new lawsuit, a plaintiff may cure an Article III standing defect simply by fil-
ing a supplemental complaint.14 
A. The Current Circuit Split Concerning Standing 
The requirement that parties have standing before a court can adjudicate 
their dispute derives from Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the pro-
vision that restricts the federal judicial power to the resolution of “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”15 The Supreme Court has made clear that no “case” or “con-
troversy” exists unless a plaintiff adequately alleges the three elements of 
standing: (1) an injury-in-fact that is both (2) fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct of the defendant and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.16 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 17–20 and accompanying text; see also infra note 29 and accompanying text 
(distinguishing between supplemental pleadings and amended pleadings). 
 13 See infra notes 15–29 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 30–42 and accompanying text. 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Justice Stephen J. Field understood the “cases” and “controversies” to 
mean “the claims or contentions of litigants brought before the courts for adjudication by regular pro-
ceedings established for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punish-
ment of wrongs.” Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1889). According to Justice Field’s defini-
tion, therefore, a case or controversy exists whenever the judicial power is capable of adjudicating a 
party’s claim. See id. Although courts almost universally use “case” and “controversy” interchangea-
bly, some scholars have suggested that the Framers understood the terms to bear separate and distinct 
meanings: “cases” introduced jurisdictional categories defined by legal subject, whereas “controver-
sies” were understood with reference to the parties—the former concerned disputes about the law and 
the latter concerned disputes between the parties. See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
447 (1994) (analyzing legislative notes and history of the United States Constitutional Convention). 
 16 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 
(2016) (defining “injury-in-fact” as “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is both “concrete 
and particularized” and “imminent”); see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 
587, 598 (2007) (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989)) (calling standing one of 
the “controlling elements” when determining whether the case-or-controversy requirement is satis-
fied); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (“Standing to sue or defend is 
an aspect of the case or controversy requirement.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 47; Nicholas 
Green, Note, Standing in the Future: The Case for a Substantial Risk Theory of “Injury in Fact” in 
Consumer Data Breach Class Actions, 58 B.C. L. REV. 287, 292 (2017) (detailing the three require-
ments of constitutional standing: (1) injury-in-fact, (2) traceability, and (3) redressability. This Com-
ment generally uses the terms “Article III standing” and “standing” interchangeably, although they are 
not strictly synonymous. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, 454 U.S. 464, 471–76 (1982) (distinguishing the standing doctrine’s constitutional requirements 
from its “prudential” or judge-made requirements). 
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Although there is no dispute that Article III standing is required for feder-
al jurisdiction,17 there are two competing approaches to the issue of whether 
events occurring after the filing of an original complaint may cure an Article 
III standing defect.18 The first approach, followed by the Seventh, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits, holds that a plaintiff must file a new lawsuit if a standing defect 
exists at the time an action is brought, even when subsequent events could cure 
the defect.19 The second, by contrast, adopted by the First, Second, Fourth, 
Ninth, and Federal Circuits—and now, the D.C. Circuit as well—holds that a 
plaintiff may cure a standing defect by filing a supplemental complaint alleg-
ing facts that arose after the filing of the original complaint.20 
Circuits that have adopted the first approach have grounded their reason-
ing largely in two Supreme Court cases: Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envi-
ronmental Services, 21 decided in 2000, and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, de-
cided in 1992.22 In Laidlaw, the Court, with neither citation nor explanation, 
noted that the focus of its standing inquiry was whether the plaintiff had Arti-
cle III standing “at the outset of the litigation.”23 Likewise, in Lujan, the Court 
held that the plaintiff failed to plead facts supportive of standing in the initial 
complaint, citing its “longstanding rule” that courts must look to the facts at 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (stating that the standing doctrine 
requires courts to ensure that a plaintiff sufficiently alleges “a personal stake in the outcome” such that 
adjudication of the dispute is warranted). 
 18 See Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1183 (indicating the existence of a circuit split and listing relevant 
cases). 
 19 S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Palma, 707 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2013); Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, 577 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2009); Park v. Forest Serv., 205 F.3d 1034, 1037–38 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
 20 Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015); United 
States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2015); Daniels v. Arcade, L.P., 477 
F. App’x 125, 131 (4th Cir. 2012); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); Travelers, 973 F.2d at 87–88. Thus, after the Scahill decision, the number of circuits 
adopting this approach constitutes at least a plurality of the courts of appeals. See 909 F.3d at 1183. 
 21 528 U.S. 167 (2000). In its 2007 decision, Mink v. Suthers, the Tenth Circuit cited to Laidlaw 
for the proposition that “standing is determined at the time the action is brought.” 482 F.3d 1244, 
1253 (10th Cir. 2007). Additionally, in the Seventh Circuit’s 2009 decision, Pollack, the court ex-
pressly relied on Laidlaw in holding that standing may only be established at the time of the initial 
suit. 577 F.3d at 742 n.2. 
 22 504 U.S. 555 (1992). In its 2005 decision, Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit cited Lujan when holding that the “initial standing of the original plaintiff is assessed 
at the time of the original complaint, even if the complaint is later amended.” 402 F.3d 1198, 1203 n.3 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Park, 205 F.3d at 1037–38 (citing Lujan when reasoning that “if redressa-
bility may not be established by a development that occurs after the commencement of the litigation, 
neither may an injury-in-fact”). It is worth noting, however, that the Federal Circuit appears to have 
changed its approach to the issue since Schreiber Foods. See Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1337 (assessing 
standing based on facts alleged in plaintiff’s amended complaint). 
 23 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180. 
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the time the initial complaint is filed when settling questions of jurisdiction.24 
Neither Laidlaw nor Lujan concerned post-complaint factual developments 
sufficient to constitute injury-in-fact to a plaintiff who had previously been 
determined to lack standing.25 
On the other hand, circuits favoring the second approach have justified 
their stance based on a reading of Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (Rule 15(d)), which allows a plaintiff to correct certain defects in the 
complaint by filing a supplemental pleading.26 In 2015, for instance, the Ninth 
Circuit held that, although Rule 15(d) mentions only the correction of deficient 
statements of “claim[s] or defense[s],” the rule is broad enough to allow for the 
correction of other jurisdictional defects, including defects of standing.27 Sca-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569–70 n.4. (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 
830 (1989)). Though approvingly citing the Court’s 1989 decision in Newman-Green v. Alfonzo-
Larrain, Justice Antonin Scalia’s Lujan opinion notably neglects to mention Newman-Green’s con-
cession that, “[l]ike most general principles,” the principle that jurisdiction depends on the facts as 
they exist at the time of initial filing “is susceptible to exceptions . . . .” Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 
830. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555–578. 
 25 See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167. In Lujan, the issue was not that the plaintiffs 
alleged that new events after the time of filing cured a standing deficiency; rather, the issue was that 
the plaintiffs’ allegation of injury-in-fact was based, in the view of the Court, on “pure speculation and 
fantasy.” 504 U.S. at 567. In Laidlaw, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff, 
an environmental advocacy group, needed to demonstrate “harm to the environment” to maintain 
Article III standing, holding that the relevant showing for Article III standing is injury to the plaintiff 
alone, which the plaintiff had adequately pleaded. See 528 U.S. at 181–83. As such, both cases are 
quite dissimilar from Scahill. See infra notes 31–42 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Gadbois, 809 F.3d at 5, 6 n.2 (“Rule 15(d) has been viewed as an appropriate mechanism 
for pleading newly arising facts necessary to demonstrate standing . . . . [W]e conclude that a supple-
mental pleading can be used to cure a jurisdictional defect . . . .”); Northstar Fin. Advisors, 779 F.3d 
at 1044–47 (holding that Rule 15(d) allows a plaintiff lacking standing at the start of litigation to cure 
the deficiency by filing a supplemental pleading); Travelers, 973 F.2d at 88 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
15(d)) (permitting leave to amend for plaintiff to allege sufficient facts in support of injury-in-fact). In 
relevant part, Rule 15(d) states: 
On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened 
after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit supplementa-
tion even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). Although arguments based directly on the text and Advisory Committee notes 
to Rule 15(d) appear to be the dominant tactic, some circuits that favor the second, more flexible, 
approach have also relied on Supreme Court precedent interpreting Rule 15(d) to bolster their posi-
tion. See, e.g., Northstar Fin. Advisors, 779 F.3d at 1044–47. In its 2015 decision, Northstar Financial 
Advisors, for example, the Ninth Circuit relied in part on the Supreme Court’s allowance of a supple-
mental pleading to cure a defective claim in a not-yet-certified class action in the 1976 case, Matthews 
v. Diaz. See id. (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 (1976)); see also Daniels, 477 F. App’x at 
125, 131 (quoting Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2007)) (“[W]hen a 
plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to 
the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 27 Northstar Fin. Advisors, 779 F.3d at 1044 (holding that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 
treated like a deficient statement of “claim” or defense” for purposes of Rule 15(d)) (citing 6A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1507 (3d ed. 2010)). Recently, 
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hill, following the trend, utilized this same rules-based strategy.28 In doing so, 
the D.C. Circuit offered perhaps the most comprehensive and robust justifica-
tion yet by a court of appeals for allowing a plaintiff to cure an Article III 
standing defect through a supplemental pleading.29 
B. Factual and Procedural Background of Scahill 
Although the particular facts of Scahill are not critical to an understanding 
of the D.C. Circuit’s holding regarding standing, a brief overview of the factual 
and procedural background of the case is nonetheless valuable.30 In January 
2015, HRH Services, LLC (HRH) applied to the District of Columbia Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) for a liquor license for HRH’s pub, the 
Alibi.31 The ABC Board approved the license on May 18, 2016, subject to sev-
eral conditions.32 Among other restrictions, the ABC Board conditioned receipt 
of the license on HRH’s promise to prohibit Martin Scahill, a former restaurant 
owner with a history of permitting underage alcohol consumption at his estab-
lishment, from having any involvement with, or even entering the premises of, 
the Alibi.33 On July 28, 2016, after HRH’s motion for administrative review 
was denied by the ABC Board, it appealed the decision to the D.C. Court of 
Appeals, pursuant to the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act’s 
                                                                                                                           
however, the Ninth Circuit has created some confusion about the holding of Northstar Financial Advi-
sors with respect to standing. See Ree v. Zappos.com, Inc. (In re Zappos.com, Inc.) 888 F.3d 1020, 
1028 n.10 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Northstar Fin. Advisors, 779 F.3d at 1044) (“[T]hese cases do not 
actually address whether standing is measured at the time of an initial complaint or at the time of an 
amended complaint, as opposed to whether the allegations in an amended complaint may sometimes 
be considered in evaluating whether there was standing at the time the case was originally filed or 
whether an amended complaint may be considered a supplemental pleading under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15(d).”). 
 28 See 909 F.3d at 1184 (characterizing the approach that would assess a plaintiff’s standing based 
only on the facts at the time of initial filing as “harken[ing] back to the type of technical obstacle . . . 
that the amendment to Rule 15(d) was designed to avoid”). 
 29 See id. The court in Scahill does, however, use the word “amended,” not “supplemental,” in its 
decision. Id. (“Therefore, we hold that a plaintiff may cure a standing defect under Article III through 
an amended pleading alleging facts that arose after filing the original complaint.”) (emphasis added). 
Although often used interchangeably by parties and courts, amended and supplemental pleadings are 
indeed distinct: the former relates to matters that occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading 
and entirely replaces the original pleading, while the latter relates to events that took place after the 
original pleading was filed and preserves the original pleading. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, 
§ 1504. 
 30 See infra notes 31–42 and accompanying text. 
 31 Scahill v. District of Columbia, 271 F. Supp. 3d 216, 221 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. The friction between the ABC Board and Scahill apparently dates back to when Scahill was 
part-owner of the Alibi’s predecessor restaurant. See id. During his tenure, the restaurant’s history of 
allowing underage drinking resulted in several fines from the ABC Board. Id. It appears that the con-
ditions placed on HRH’s liquor license reflected the ABC Board’s concern that Scahill’s involvement 
would encourage the Alibi to adopt Scahill’s prior criminal practice. See Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1180. 
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judicial review provision.34 Ultimately, the D.C. Court of Appeals dismissed 
the appeal for lack of standing, concluding that HRH failed to allege that the 
restrictions imposed by the ABC Board regarding Scahill’s involvement with 
Alibi caused any injury-in-fact.35 
On October 18, 2016, HRH and Scahill brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the ABC Board 
and the District of Columbia.36 Thereafter, the district court granted the defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing, finding that, in light of the D.C. 
Court of Appeals’ previous determination, collateral estoppel prevented HRH 
from re-litigating the issue of its standing.37 Then, on October 16, 2017, HRH 
moved for reconsideration and leave to file a second amended complaint alleg-
ing that, on July 19, 2017, the ABC Board issued a $4,000 fine against HRH for 
a supposed violation of the liquor license conditions.38 Although the district 
court found that the fine would potentially constitute an injury-in-fact, it held 
that such a fine, imposed nine months after the filing of the original complaint, 
came too late to confer standing upon HRH.39 The district court reasoned that 
“the standing inquiry is focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had 
the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.”40 Accordingly, the 
district court found that, contrary to HRH’s insistence, the alleged factual devel-
opment did not trigger the so-called “curable defect exception” to collateral es-
toppel, and therefore denied HRH’s motions for reconsideration and leave to file 
a second amended complaint.41 Following appeal by HRH, the D.C. Circuit re-
viewed the district court’s decision.42 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Scahill, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 224; see D.C. CODE § 2-510(a) (2020) (“Any person suffering a 
legal wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved, by an order or decision of the Mayor or an agency in 
a contested case, is entitled to a judicial review thereof in accordance with this subchapter upon filing 
in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a written petition for review.”) (emphasis added). 
 35 Scahill, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 225; see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (defining “injury-in-fact” 
as “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “immi-
nent”); Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (holding that standing requires showing of injury-in-fact). 
 36 Scahill, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 222. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to bring a civil action against 
anyone who, under color of state law—or, as here, D.C. law—deprives the plaintiff of their constitu-
tional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). Here, HRH and Scahill argued that the conditions placed on 
the receipt of the liquor license violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom 
of association. Scahill, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 222. 
 37 Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1180. The doctrine of collateral estoppel diminishes a party’s ability to 
litigate issues that were conclusively determined in prior actions. Note, Collateral Estoppel by Judg-
ment, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 649–50 (1952). 
 38 Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1181. 
 39 Scahill v. District of Columbia, 286 F. Supp. 3d 12, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Davis v. 
FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)). 
 40 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 41 Id. at 19 (finding that the fine HRH received did not injure HRH “during the period of time 
when it would have made a difference”); see also Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Jewell, 195 F. Supp. 3d 
66, 72 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 786 F.3d 34, 41 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (defining the curable defect exception as a “narrow exception [that] ‘allows relitigation of juris-
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II. SCAHILL PUSHES THE CIRCUITS EVEN FURTHER  
AWAY FROM FORMALISM 
By the time Scahill v. District of Columbia was decided in 2018, a plurality 
of the circuits already expressed disfavor with the formalistic approach to the 
issue of whether post-complaint events may confer standing where none existed 
at the time of filing.43 This Part discusses how, persuaded by certain policy con-
siderations and a reading of Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit added to this 
plurality by holding that events subsequent to the initial filing of a complaint, if 
alleged in a supplemental pleading, can cure a standing defect, such that a plain-
tiff need not refile suit.44 
On December 7, 2018, the D.C. Circuit decided Scahill, addressing for 
the first time whether the lack of Article III standing at the outset of litigation 
is determinative of a court’s jurisdiction.45 Given the somewhat unusual proce-
dural history and posture of the case,46 the court framed the issue as whether 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel’s “curable defect exception” permits a plain-
tiff to demonstrate Article III standing based on events that occurred after the 
filing of the initial complaint.47 More fundamentally, however, the court sought 
to settle a basic question of federal jurisdiction not yet addressed by the circuit: 
when assessing whether a plaintiff has Article III standing, is a court limited to 
the facts alleged in the original complaint, or may it consider additional allega-
tions set forth by the plaintiff in a supplemental or amended complaint?48 
The court began by elaborating the elements of collateral estoppel and de-
termined that the district court correctly found that HRH satisfied all of the 
elements with respect to the issue of its standing.49 Then, turning to the district 
                                                                                                                           
dictional dismissals’” when “a material change following dismissal cured the original jurisdictional 
deficiency”). 
 42 Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1182. 
 43 909 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text (noting that the 
First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits have held that a plaintiff may cure a standing defect 
through a supplemental complaint). 
 44 FED. R. CIV. P. 15; see infra notes 45–65 and accompanying text. 
 45 909 F.3d at 1179. The court also reviewed, and affirmed, the district court’s dismissal of HRH 
and Scahill’s First Amendment claims. See id. at 1184–86. This aspect of the decision is outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
 46 See id. at 1179–80. The plaintiffs initially sought review of the defendants’ conduct by the D.C. 
Court of Appeals, after which they filed a new suit in federal district court and then subsequently 
moved for reconsideration. Id. 
 47 Id. at 1179. 
 48 Id. at 1182. 
 49 Id. The court found that, in light of the D.C. Court of Appeals’ dismissal, the issue of HRH’s 
standing to challenge the Board’s license conditions was (1) “contested,” and (2) “actually and neces-
sarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,” and that, at the time HRH filed suit in federal 
district court, applying issue preclusion (3) “involve[d] no basic unfairness to HRH.” Id. As such, 
according to the D.C. Circuit, the district court’s conclusion that collateral estoppel applied to the 
II.-238 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
court’s refusal to apply the curable defect exception to collateral estoppel,50 the 
court found that the case law relied on by the district court, Davis v. FEC, was 
inapposite.51 According to the Scahill court, although Davis held that standing 
is satisfied at the outset of litigation even if an anticipated injury fails to mani-
fest, the decision did not speak to whether subsequent events can confer stand-
ing that was lacking at the time litigation commenced.52 Concluding that nei-
ther the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit had directly addressed the issue at 
hand, the court surveyed an eight-circuit split for guidance.53 Notably, 
throughout its entire opinion, the court did not cite once to either Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services or Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the 
leading Supreme Court decisions on standing.54 
The D.C. Circuit, following the Ninth Circuit’s lead in 2015’s Northstar 
Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Investments,55 focused its discussion of the 
issue primarily around Rule 15(d).56 Citing the Advisory Committee notes to 
Rule 15(d), the court concluded that the rule was intended to grant courts 
“broad discretion” for the sake of saving plaintiffs from filing a new lawsuit 
when events subsequent to the filing of the original action indicated a right to 
relief.57 As such, the court reversed the district court’s decision on the issue of 
                                                                                                                           
issue of HRH’s standing was correct. Id.; see also Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia, 91 F.3d 
193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (listing the three conditions that must be met for collateral estoppel, or issue 
preclusion, to apply: contestation, necessity, and fairness). 
 50 See Scahill v. District of Columbia, 286 F. Supp. 3d 12, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2017). Again, the dis-
trict court’s reasoning for declining to apply the exception was that “the standing inquiry is ‘focused 
on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was 
filed.’” Id. 
 51 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729–34 (2008); Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1182. In its 2008 decision 
Davis v. FEC, the Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff, a candidate for the U.S. House of 
Representatives, had alleged the requisite injury-in-fact in a constitutional challenge to the asymmet-
rical campaign contribution limits of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 when his opponent 
had yet to qualify for higher campaign contribution limits at the commencement of the lawsuit. See 
Davis, 554 U.S. at 729–34. The Court found that the plaintiff alleged the requisite injury-in-fact when 
he indicated his intent to spend his personal funds. Id.; Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1182. 
 52 Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1182. 
 53 Id. at 1183 (noting that the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth and Federal Circuits have, in some 
cases, held that a plaintiff may cure defects of standing by alleging new facts in a supplemental plead-
ing and that the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have restricted the standing inquiry strictly to the 
facts alleged in the original complaint); see supra notes 19–20 (citing circuit cases within split). 
 54 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). See generally Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1179–1186. 
 55 Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015); see supra 
notes 26–27 and accompanying text (discussing Northstar Financial Advisors). 
 56 See Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1183–84. 
 57 Id. at 1183 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment) 
(concluding that Rule 15(d) was meant to avoid “needlessly remitting plaintiffs to the difficulties of 
commencing a new action even though events occurring after the commencement of the original ac-
tion have made clear the right to relief”). The court acknowledged the potential peril of expanding the 
power of district courts to allow supplemental pleadings but dampened such concerns by concluding 
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standing, determining that the district court should have applied collateral es-
toppel’s curable defect exception, and thus, should have allowed HRH to file 
its proposed second amended complaint—a supplemental pleading that would 
have cured the standing defect.58 
In addition to Rule 15(d), two other factors motivated the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding.59 First, the court expressed the view that, as a matter of policy, forcing 
a plaintiff to file a new lawsuit instead of simply filing a new pleading is inef-
ficient and overly formalistic.60 Such an approach, according to the court, cre-
ates needless obstacles and expenses for plaintiffs, who, besides having to pay 
the costs of filing a new suit, would have to wait even longer for their claims to 
be resolved.61 Second, the defendant District of Columbia’s failure to provide 
the court with any argument that its proffered approach was superior gave the 
court little incentive to consider the alternative approach to assessing stand-
ing.62 Indeed, although the District of Columbia cited the Tenth Circuit’s 2013 
decision in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma63 in its brief, it merely 
stated that the case constituted “significant authority contrary to plaintiffs’ po-
sition,” without further explanation or argument.64 Thus, compelling policy 
reasons and the failure of the defendant to advance any argument to the contra-
ry made it even easier for the D.C. Circuit to hold that an assessment of a 
plaintiff’s standing need not be limited to the facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s 
initial complaint.65 
III. ALTHOUGH NOT WITHOUT FLAWS, SCAHILL REPRESENTS  
A MODEL APPROACH FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Despite weaknesses in the D.C. Circuit’s Scahill v. District of Columbia 
decision, it adopts the best approach to the issue of whether a plaintiff may 
cure an Article III standing deficiency through a supplemental pleading.66 This 
                                                                                                                           
that Rule 15(d)’s requirements of “reasonable notice” and “just terms” will adequately curb any over-
indulgence. See id. at 1184; FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). 
 58 Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1184. Nonetheless, the court ultimately affirmed the dismissal, on the mer-
its, of the plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the District of Columbia had a strong interest in restrict-
ing the ability to sell liquor to those “of good character” and that the Supreme Court has not yet rec-
ognized a general First Amendment right to “social association.” Id. at 1184–86 (citing City of Dallas 
v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).  
 59 Id. at 1183–84. 
 60 Id. at 1184. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. (“[T]he government offers no analysis of which approach this court should adopt.”). 
 63 707 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the standing inquiry focuses on the facts 
and circumstances as they existed when the original complaint was filed). 
 64 Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1184. By its reticence, the District of Colombia missed an opportunity to 
provide a much-needed justification for the formalistic approach to the standing inquiry. See id. 
 65 See id. 
 66 909 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see infra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
II.-240 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
Part assesses the gravity of those weaknesses and presents a final argument in 
favor of Scahill.67 
For proponents of the formalistic approach to the Article III standing in-
quiry that Scahill rejects, three weaknesses in the D.C. Circuit’s treatment of 
the issue may appear glaring.68 First, the court failed to address significant Su-
preme Court precedent contrary to its holding.69 As discussed above, several 
circuits have cited Laidlaw70 and Lujan71 in support of the formalistic ap-
proach that measures a plaintiff’s Article III standing based solely on the origi-
nal complaint.72 For whatever reason, the D.C. Circuit elected not to expressly 
distinguish this case law.73 Nonetheless, this flaw is not as severe as it may 
first seem—both Laidlaw and Lujan, after all, dealt with facts quite distinct 
from Scahill.74 
Second, the D.C. Circuit drifted considerably from the text of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 15(d).75 Rule 15(d) allows for supplementation of pleadings 
only when the initial pleading fails to properly state a “claim or defense;” it 
makes no allowance for supplementation to cure other deficiencies, namely, ju-
risdictional ones.76 At the same time, however, the Scahill reading of Rule 15(d) 
is hardly novel, much less unorthodox.77 Moreover, the Advisory Committee 
notes to the rule generally support a liberal construction of the rule’s text.78 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See infra notes 68–88 and accompanying text. 
 68 See Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1182–84. 
 69 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 70 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 71 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 72 See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 73 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the district court, too, did not 
mention Laidlaw or Lujan when it found that the standing inquiry is limited only to the facts and cir-
cumstances as alleged in the original complaint, expressly relying only on Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 
724, 734 (2008). See Scahill v. District of Columbia, 286 F. Supp. 3d 12, 19 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 74 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. In Laidlaw, the Court determined that the plaintiff 
had standing at the outset of litigation, thus, there was never any consideration of whether subsequent 
events could confer standing where none existed at the start of the suit. See 528 U.S. at 187. Although 
Lujan is somewhat more on point—the court broadly declares that “standing is to be determined as of 
the commencement of the suit”—it is nonetheless distinguishable from Scahill because the plaintiffs 
in Lujan had not moved to amend or supplement the complaint. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569–71.  
 75 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d); Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1184 (citing with approval the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach in Northstar Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 
2015), which held that Rule 15(d)’s mention of deficiencies in “claim[s] or defense[s]” applied to 
jurisdictional deficiencies broadly). 
 76 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) (emphasis added). 
 77 See United States ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 5, 6 n.2 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(“Rule 15(d) has been viewed as an appropriate mechanism for pleading newly arising facts necessary 
to demonstrate standing.”); see also Feldman v. Law Enf’t Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 
2014) (construing the complaint as a supplemental pleading under Rule 15(d) so as to cure a jurisdic-
tional defect). 
 78 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) advisory committee’s notes to 1963 amendment. (“Rule 15(d) is 
intended to give the court broad discretion in allowing a supplemental pleading.”); see also Harris v. 
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Finally, there is perhaps some irony in Scahill’s use of Rule 15(d) to justi-
fy its reversal of the district court’s decision on the issue of standing.79 Alt-
hough the court declared that Rule 15(d) was intended to “place broad discre-
tion” in a district court’s decision to grant a plaintiff’s request for supplementa-
tion, it simultaneously reversed the district court’s exercise of such discre-
tion.80 In other words, the D.C. Circuit’s decision may appear internally incon-
gruent insofar as it declared that district courts have broad discretion to deny 
requests for supplementation, yet disapproved of the District of D.C.’s denial 
of HRH’s request for supplementation.81 Nevertheless, to the extent the district 
court denied HRH’s motion to amend because it felt it had no other option, the 
D.C. Circuit’s holding, alerting the lower courts to the wide span of their dis-
cretion, is scarcely contradictory.82 Indeed, parsing its decision on reconsidera-
tion, the district court’s denial of HRH’s supplementation request appears far 
more reflexive than discretionary.83  
These weaknesses, largely hollow, do not ultimately detract from Sca-
hill’s merits.84 After surveying the circuit split on the issue of whether new 
events may grant Article III standing to a plaintiff who lacked it at the time of 
filing, one finds little justification for the formalistic approach of the Seventh, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, particularly in light of the liberal thrust of Rule 
15(d).85 Put simply, there is no compelling reason, policy-based or otherwise, 
to approach deficiencies of standing differently from deficiencies in stating a 
claim or defense.86 By holding that subsequent pleadings may be granted to 
                                                                                                                           
Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 992–93 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that the Advisory Committee’s notes empha-
size that Rule 15(d) “is intended to allow both courts and litigants flexibility” in granting supple-
mental pleadings). 
 79 See Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1184. 
 80 See id. Thus, the D.C. Circuit may appear to be saying one thing while doing another. See id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 See Scahill, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 19. Indeed, the district court’s decision on reconsideration does 
not evince an understanding that the denial of HRH’s motion to amend was discretionary. See id. To 
the contrary, the decision suggests the district court felt constrained; although it held that the ABC 
Board’s July 2017 fine would constitute a “material change” that “followed dismissal” for the purpos-
es of applying the curable defect exception to collateral estoppel, the district court concluded that 
denial was nonetheless necessary because HRH lacked standing “at the time at which standing must 
be assessed for this case.” Id. As such, it seems far-fetched to posit that the district court declined to 
exercise discretion on the issue of supplementation. See id. Rather, the district court’s actions suggest 
an unawareness that discretion could even be exercised at all. See id. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 85 See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text (noting that the approach of these circuits is 
based largely, if not exclusively, on Supreme Court dicta in cases that presented dissimilar facts). 
 86 See Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should be treated like any other defect for purposes of defining the 
proper scope of supplemental pleading.”). Notwithstanding this Comment’s central thesis, it must be 
noted that there are undoubtedly compelling reasons to assess standing sooner, rather than later, in the 
litigation process. See Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed 
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correct jurisdictional defects, Scahill eliminates the absurd scenario where 
plaintiffs who possess standing have their suit dismissed for lack of standing.87 
Compared with beginning a new lawsuit from scratch, filing a supplemental 
complaint not only avoids added time and expense—it promotes justice.88 
CONCLUSION 
In its 2018 decision, Scahill v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit held 
that instead of filing a new lawsuit, a plaintiff may cure an Article III standing 
defect simply by filing a supplemental complaint. Contributing to a growing 
circuit split on a hotly contested issue of federal civil practice and procedure, 
Scahill pushed the Courts of Appeals’ approach to Article III standing further 
toward efficiency—and further from judicial rigidity and formalism. This deci-
sion, although arguably flawed at first glance, represents a model approach for 
the circuits to follow. Besides being a boon to plaintiffs, who will have greater 
leeway to cure jurisdictional deficiencies and avoid the hassle of refiling suit 
                                                                                                                           
Solution to the Serious (but Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 
1402–04 (2014) (arguing that, by postponing determinations of standing, courts may coercively im-
pact litigant behavior (e.g., by motivating a settlement agreement) despite having no authority to do so 
under Article III). For instance, if a court waits until the trial stage to consider a plaintiff’s standing, 
only to determine that no injury-in-fact has been alleged, then both parties will have wasted time and 
expense litigating a claim that was not valid in the first place. See id. Further, deferring resolution of 
standing to the later stages of litigation may raise grave constitutional concerns. Id. Nonetheless, to 
say that standing ought to be assessed early in, or at the outset of, the litigation process is quite differ-
ent from saying, as some circuits have, that the presence or absence of standing at the outset of litiga-
tion is conclusive as to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Be-
atrice Cheese, Inc., 402 F.3d 1198, 1202 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (limiting the standing inquiry to the facts 
as alleged in the original complaint, even though supplemental complaints had been filed). The former 
position would not, in principle, rule out an amended complaint setting forth new facts that cure de-
fects of standing. See Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]hile [l]ater events may not create jurisdiction where none existed at the time of filing, the proper 
focus in determining jurisdiction are the facts existing at the time the complaint under consideration 
was filed.”) (internal citations omitted). The latter position, on the other hand, which would dismiss an 
action for lack of standing even when new events subsequent to filing would confer standing, is the 
approach that the Scahill district court felt it was required to adopt—and the approach that this Com-
ment argues ought to be discarded. See 286 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (determining that the plaintiff’s standing 
deficiency remained uncured despite the plaintiff’s allegation of an injury-in-fact, because such injury 
failed to occur “during the period of time when it would have made a difference”). 
 87 See Scahill, 909 F.3d at 1183–84. 
 88 Cf. Chedid v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 756 F. Supp. 941, 944–45 (E.D. Va. 1991) (noting 
that transfer of a case from a district where venue is improper to a district where venue is proper, by 
avoiding unnecessary delay to resolution of parties’ claims, is more likely than dismissal to serve the 
interests of justice). Furthermore, if parties are forced to refile suits rather than simply amend their 
complaints, then, in addition to the disadvantages mentioned above, their claims may also suffer other 
ills, such as becoming barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Adam Wolek & Rashad 
Simmons, A District Court Split on Curing Copyright Timing Defects, LAW360 (Aug. 15, 2019), 
www.law360.com/articles/1188726/a-district-court-split-on-curing-copyright-timing-defects [https://
perma.cc/J8KS-UT7X] (arguing that plaintiffs’ attempts to cure copyright registration timing defects 
through new lawsuits could nonetheless implicate statutes of limitations concerns). 
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when they have demonstrated a clear right to relief, Scahill is a win for the 
federal courts. Given that federal dockets will likely remain congested for the 
foreseeable future, measures that expedite the final resolution of claims, so 
long as they do not come at the expense of fairness to litigants, ought to be 
embraced. 
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